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PHYsIcIANs AND SURGEONS-MALPRACTICE---CouRT DISREGARD FOR
THE STANDARD OF THE PROFESSION-THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE-Helling v. Carey, 83 Wn. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974); WASH. REV.
CODE § 4.24.290 (Supp. 1975).

Plaintiff Barbara Helling first consulted the defendant ophthalmologists in 1959 complaining of myopia (nearsightedness). She was
fitted with contact lenses and thereafter returned occasionally for
examination and treatment for complications believed by defendants
to have been caused by her lenses. Nine years after her initial visit a

combination of symptoms existed which, in light of current medical
standards, required the defendants to test her eye pressure and peripheral vision. The tests indicated that plaintiff, then 32 years of age,

had been suffering from primary open-angle glaucoma' for approximately 10 years.
Plaintiff alleged at trial that defendants were negligent in failing to
administer the eye pressure test at an earlier time and that, as a proximate result, she sustained permanent damage to her eyes.2 Plaintiff
requested an instruction which would have permitted the jury to find
defendants liable despite their adherence to the degree of care and
skill ordinarily exercised by members of their profession.3 The trial
court refused to give the requested instruction, and judgment for the
defendant physicians was entered upon a verdict in their favor. The
Washington Court of Appeals affirmed. 4 The Washington Supreme
1. Glaucoma is defined as "a group of eye diseases characterized by an increase
in intraocular pressure .......
DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 650
(25th ed. 1974). For other symptoms, see note 51 infra. The mechanism which normally permits drainage of the fluid contained within the eyeball malfunctions and
the continued addition of fresh fluid causes a buildup of fluid pressure against the
walls of, and the structures within, the eye. 1 J. SCHIIDT, ATTORNEYS' DIcTIoNARY OF
MEDICINE AND WORD FINDER G-19 (1974). "Primary" glaucoma occurs in an eye
which has not been diseased previously, while "open-angle" refers to a form of primary glaucoma in which, although the angle mechanism remains open, the tissues of
the mechanism cause the diminished drainage. DORLAND'S, supra, at 650-51. The
disease causes pathological changes in the eye and, if not arrested, eventual loss of
vision. I J. SCHMIDT, supra, at G-19.
2. 83 Wn. 2d at 516-17, 519 P.2d at 982. The eye pressure test revealed that
plaintiff had permanently lost most of her peripheral vision and that her central
vision was reduced to approximately five degrees vertical by 10 degrees horizontal.
Id.
3. Id. at 517, 519 P.2d at 982. Plaintiff sought to argue to the jury that the
standard of the ophthalmologic profession was inadequate to protect her from
the incidence of glaucoma. Id.
4. Helling v. Carey, 8 Wn. App. 1005 (1973) (unpublished opinion).
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Court reversed and remanded for a new trial on the issue of damages.
Held: Although defendant physicians had complied with the standard
practices of their profession, they were negligent as a matter of law in
their failure to perform the pressure test at a time when plaintiffs
permanent disability could have been avoided. Helling v. Carey, 83
Wn. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974).
This note will examine the relationship between the standard of
care and the role of expert medical testimony in medical malpractice
actions, discuss various interpretations of the Helling decision, and
suggest the most practical of those interpretations, particularly in light
of the subsequent enactment of R.C.W. § 4.24.290. 5 The purpose of
this statute was to nullify the Helling decision and re-establish the preHelling standards of negligence in medical malpractice cases. 6 As will
be demonstrated, although the statute in large part succeeds in allaying the fears of medical practitioners and defense attorneys which

5.

WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.290 (Supp. 1975) provides:

In any civil action for damages based on professional negligence against a
hospital which is licensed by the state of Washington or against the personnel
of any such hospital, or against a member of the healing arts including, but not
limited to, a physician licensed under chapter 18.71 RCW, an osteopathic physician licensed under chapter 18.57 RCW, a chiropractor licensed under chapter
18.25 RCW, a dentist licensed under chapter 18.32 RCW, a podiatrist licensed
under chapter 18.22 RCW, or a nurse licensed under chapters 18.78 or 18.88
RCW, the plaintiff in order to prevail shall be required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant or defendants failed to exercise that
degree of skill, care and learning possessed by other persons in the same profession and that as a proximate result of such failure the plaintiff suffered damages,
but in no event shall the provisions of this section apply to an action based
on the failure to obtain the informed consent of a patient.
6. WASHINGTON HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 44th LEGIS., 1st Ex. SEss., BILL
REPORT ON SUB. HOUSE BILL 246 (March 24, 1975). The report states, in pertinent part:

Purpose of Bill and Effect on Existing Law: This bill is occasioned by a recent
holding by the Wash. State Supreme Court regarding the standard of care required of physicians. In Helling v. Carey the court held that in a malpractice
suit it is sufficient for plaintiff to prove that the physician failed to provide
reasonable and prudent care in light of all of the circumstances-even though he
in fact adhered to that standard of care expected of the average practitioner in
his field. Helling says, regardless of established practice, if the facts involved
indicate that a certain duty to perform should exist then the professional is
liable for breaches of that duty. The bill as introduced would re-establish the
pre-Helling standards of negligence that have been developed through case law
in Washington. (See Pederson v. Dumouchel [72 Wn. 2d 73, 431 P.2d 973
(1967)] and Hayes v. Hulswit [73 Wn. 2d 796, 440 P.2d 849 (1968)]).
Effect of SUBSTITUTE BILL: Requires medical malpractice plaintiff to show
that defendant failed to exercise the degree of skill, care and learning possessed
by others in the same profession and that such failure caused damages. Excludes
from this requirement actions based on failure to obtain informed consent of a
patient.

168

Medical Malpractice
were induced by Helling v. Carey, the case retains significance in
its potential for expanding lay participation in determining the applicable standard of care in medical malpractice cases.
I.

THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO ESTABLISHING
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LIABILITY

A.

Standardof Care

The standard of care, as used herein, is a rule of law which provides the trier of fact with the controlling test for negligence. 7 The
standard of the profession, on the other hand, is the degree of skill
and knowledge ordinarily exercised within a particular profession as
observed by the courts.8 In most negligence actions, the standard of
care to which the defendant must conform is that degree of care
which, in the jury's view, a reasonable person of ordinary prudence
would have exercised in the defendant's place in the same or similar
circumstances.9 In medical malpractice actions, however, the standard
of care traditionally has been that degree of skill and learning which is
ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of the medical profession in good standing. 10 In short, the standard of care has generally
been held to be the standard of the profession.
When the standard of care in a medical malpractice action is so
7.

For further discussion of the controlling test for negligence see W. PROSSER,
§§ 30-33 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
8. These definitions are proffered to delineate the terms, which courts have occa-

LAW OF TORTS

sionally confused. See, e.g., Chappetta v. Ciaravella, 311 So. 2d 563 (La. App. 1975);
Marchlewicz v. Stanton, 50 Mich. App. 344, 213 N.W.2d 317 (1973); Douglas v.

Bussabarger, 73 Wn. 2d 476, 438 P.2d 829 (1968); Stafford v. Hunter, 66 Wn. 2d
269, 401 P.2d 986 (1965).

9.

See PROSSER, supra note 7, § 32, at 150; Note, An Evaluation of Changes in

the Medical Standardof Care, 23 VAND. L. REv. 729 (1970).
10. Fritz v. Horsfall, 24 Wn. 2d 14, 163 P.2d 148 (1945), and Derr v. Bonney,

38 Wn. 2d 678, 231 P.2d 637 (1951), are perhaps the best exponents of this standard.
Both cases hold that a physician who follows all the customary procedures in his
treatment is not liable for malpractice. In Fritz, the court concluded that the attending physician exercised that degree of skill and care required of the average practitioner performing a gall bladder operation. The Derr court found that the physician

did not deviate from the standard of care ordinarily practiced by other doctors in
failing to take an X ray of the patient's ankle after it was placed in a cast. See also
Skodje v. Hardy, 47 Wn. 2d 557, 288 P.2d 471 (1955) (physician's failure to take

blood count, blood pressure, temperature or pulse not a departure from customary
diagnostic procedures); Woods v. Pommerening, 44 Wn. 2d 867, 271 P.2d 705

(1954) (gold injections recognized treatment for skin lesions). See generally PROSSER,
supra note 7, at 161-65.
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defined, it follows that a physician who has conformed to the standard
of the profession cannot be found negligent. Thus, in Fritz v. Horsfall," the Washington court held that a physician was not negligent in
using a recognized and approved procedure for removing the plaintiffs gall bladder, even though the patient suffered serious complications thereafter. More recently, the Washington court in Pederson v.
Dumouchel,l2 while abolishing the locality rule, 13 continued to recognize the care and skill possessed by the average medical practitioner in
a given specialty as the standard for determining whether a breach of
14
professional competence had occurred.
The standard of the profession, and consequently the standard of
care, is based on proof of the customary and usual practices within
the medical profession. 15 This result is contrary to the general rule of
tort law that customary practice and usage are not solely determinative
of the reasonableness of conduct.' 6 The deference to the medical pro11. 24 Wn. 2d 14, 163 P.2d 148 (1945).
12.
72 Wn. 2d 73, 431 P.2d 973 (1967). Pederson involved the negligent use of
general anesthesia, administered by a nurse when the defendant physician was not
present. Expert medical testimony revealed that the plaintiffs permanent severe
brain damage resulted from the anesthesia.
13. The locality rule required that a rural practitioner meet only the standard of
his colleagues practicing in the same or similar localities. This rule insulated many
physicians from the higher standards of medical practitioners in metropolitan areas.
See generally McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L.
REV. 549, 569 (1959), reprinted in I. ROADY & W. ANDERSON, PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE
13 (1960) [hereinafter cited as McCoid]. Pederson replaced the rule with one requiring a physician to meet a standard of care established in an area coextensive with
the medical means available and within ready access to the patient. For a detailed
discussion of the Pederson case and the locality rule see Note, Expanded Standards of
Carefor Washington Physicians, Dentists and Hospitals, 44 WASH. L. REV. 505 (1969).
14. Recent pronouncements of this rule in other jurisdictions include: Brown v.
Colm, II Cal. 3d 639, 522 P.2d 688, 114 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1974) (use of surgical
sutures not absorbable by body); McKinney v. Reardon, 337 A.2d 514 (Del. Super.
1975) (physician's willingness to allow patient-amputee to negotiate stairs while
emerging from a hypnotic state); Chappetta v. Ciaravella, 311 So. 2d 563 (La. App.
1975) (pad left in patient's abdominal wound); Scaria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 68 Wis. 2d 1,227 N.W.2d 647 (1975) (informed consent).
15. See McCoid, supra note 13, at 606; Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42
COLuM. L. REV. 1147, 1163 (1942) [hereinafter cited as Morris].
16. See, e.g., F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 17.3, at 977-79 (1956);
1 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 8.04, at 200 (1960); Com-

ment, An Evaluation of Changes in the Medical Standard of Care, 23 VAND. L. REV.
729(1970).
However, a few courts have recently made pronouncements vaguely similar to those
of the Helling court, stating that the customs of physicians should not be solely
determinative of the standard of care. The court in Toth v. Community Hosp. at
Glen Cove, 22 N.Y.2d 55, 239 N.E.2d 368, 292 N.Y.S.2d 440 (1968), held that
although the defendant pediatrician had ordered reduction of the amount of oxygen
administered to two infant patients (which comported with the customary practices
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fession arises from the courts' realization that physicians possess unusual technical skills which laymen, in most instances, are incapable of
intelligently evaluating. Therefore, in the interests of medical science
and the health of the general public, physicians are generally free to
make medical judgments without fear of being unfairly judged by
17
people who may be prejudiced by unfortunate results.
Thus, it is usually necessary to prove the physician's deviation from
the standard of the profession in order for the trier of fact to find negligence.' 8 However, there are occasions when this is not true. In two
principal classes of cases, physicians who conform to the standard of
the profession nevertheless may be found negligent, and thus the standard of care is higher than the standard of the profession. First, when
expert medical testimony is introduced which criticizes the professional standard and claims that the standard is inadequate, the trier of
fact has been permitted to conclude that use of a method generally
accepted by the medical profession is negligent. 19 Second, when negligence is so grossly apparent that a layman would have no difficulty
recognizing it, courts have frequently permitted the trier of fact to

of his colleagues), where the orders were not carried out and blindness resulted to
the infants a jury question was presented as to whether the pediatrician was negligent in his failure to assure that the orders were followed. In Favalora v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co., 144 So. 2d 544 (La. App. 1962) the court held the defendant liable
after expert witnesses testified that the customary practice was faulty. See note 19
infra. See also Lundahl v. Rockford Mem. Hosp. Ass'n, 93 Il. App. 2d 461, 235
N.E.2d 671 (1968) (dictum); Morgan v. Sheppard, 91 Ohio L. Abs. 579, 188 N.E.
2d 808 (Ct. App. 1963); Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 282 A.2d 206 (1971).
Arguably the facts of the above cases place them within the common knowledge exception to the general medical malpractice standard of care. See text accompanying
note 20 infra.
17. See McCoid, supra note 13, at 608. The author states that a physician would
become hesitant to depend upon "his developed instinct in diagnosis and treatment"
if his medical judgment was evaluated without regard to what other medical practitioners would also have done.
18. The common elements of a case of medical malpractice have been: (a) proof
of what course of treatment the standard of the profession would require to deal
with the plaintiff's condition; (b) proof that the defendant physician deviated from
that standardi and (c) proof that the plaintiff's injuries were a direct result of the
physician's deviation from the professional customs. See generally McCoid, supra
note 13, at 614. See also, e.g., Hayes v. Hulswit, 73 Wn. 2d 796, 440 P.2d 849
(1968) (malalignment of jaw); Richison v. Nunn, 57 Wn. 2d 1, 340 P.2d 793
(1959) (encasement of nerve in scar tissue).
19. See, e.g., Favalora v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 144 So. 2d 544 (La. App. 1962).
The Louisiana court held that conformity to the standard of the profession is not
available as a defense to a physician when other physicians testify that the professional standard is not only faulty but also contrary to their medical education.
Favalorainvolved the liability of a radiologist who failed to check the patient's medical records prior to treatment.
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conclude that the standard of the profession, even though adhered to,
is inadequate. Referred to as the common knowledge exception, 20 it is
often invoked when surgical sponges or other foreign materials are
inadvertently left in a surgical opening after an operation. 2 1 In such
actions, although defendant surgeons may prove that it is customary
medical procedure to rely on nurses to account for the number of
sponges in use, the trier of fact nevertheless is allowed to find that par22
ticular professional standard below the required standard of care.
The medical malpractice rule, with its two exceptions, provides, in
effect, a presumption that the standard of care is equivalent to the
standard of the profession in medical malpractice cases. This presumption arises upon proof that the defendant adhered to the standard of the profession. Unless rebutted by proof that one of the two
aforementioned exceptions applies, this presumption allows defendant
physicians to rely upon a standard of care established by the customs
23
within their own profession.
B.

Requirement of Expert Testimony

Expert medical testimony is generally necessary to establish the
defendant's liability in a medical malpractice suit, 24 for it is only by
means of such testimony that the trier of fact may ascertain the standard of the profession and thus the legal duty of care 25 required of the
20. See generally I D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 16, § 14.06, at 439-42.
21. In Conrad v. Lakewood Gen. Hosp., 67 Wn. 2d 934, 410 P.2d 785 (1966),
the trial court correctly permitted the jury to conclude that both the surgeon and his
assisting general practitioner could be held liable for inadvertently leaving a 5 -inch
hemostat (blood vessel clamp) inside the patient's abdomen after the incision was
closed.
22. See, e.g., Ault v. Hall, 119 Ohio St. 422, 164 N.E. 518 (1928).
23.

C. STETLER & A. MORITZ, DOCTOR AND PATIENT AND THE LAW 307 (4th ed.

1962).
24. See, e.g., R. LONG, THE PHYSICIAN AND THE LAW § 2.4, at 23 (1968);
Comment, Malpractice and Medical Testimony, 77 HARV. L. REV. 333 (1963); Note.
Medical Malpractice-Expert Testimony, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 834 (1966). Illustrative
cases include: Sinz v. Owens, 33 Cal. 2d 749, 205 P.2d 3 (1949) (fracture); Funke
v. Fieldman, 212 Kan. 524, 512 P.2d 539 (1973) (spinal anesthetic); Downer v.
Veilleux, 322 A.2d 82 (Me. 1974) (fracture); Marchlewicz v. Stanton, 50 Mich.
App. 344, 213 N.W.2d 317 (1973) (anthroplasty of hip socket to femur); Emmons
v. Petry, 498 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (catheterization of male urethra):
Stafford v. Hunter, 66 Wn. 2d 269, 401 P.2d 986 (1965) (fainting); Huttner v.
MacKay, 48 Wn. 2d 378, 293 P.2d 766 (1956) (craniotomy); Fritz v. Horsfall. 24
Wn. 2d 14, 163 P.2d 148 (1945) (removal of gall bladder).
25. Although this is the general rule, there are two exceptions to the use of expert testimony in this manner. See notes 19-22 and accompanying text supra.
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defendant. Traditionally, the jury has also considered medical testimony in determining whether the defendant failed to meet the standard of the profession. Recently however, in Douglas v. Bussabarger,2 6 the Washington Supreme Court continued a trend and further
liberalized the medical testimony rule2 7 by requiring medical testimony only to establish the standard of the profession. 28 Once that
standard was established, the court allowed other evidence to be
considered in determining whether the physician departed from that
standard.2 9 Thus the Douglas rule curtails the scope of the expert testimony requirement, limiting the need for such evidence. This, in turn,
expands the manner in which one of the basic prerequisites for malpractice liability-a departure from the standard of the professionmay be proven.
II.

HELLING-A BREAK FROM THE PAST?

The decision in Helling v. Carey, that the defendant physicians
were liable for negligence despite their compliance with recognized
professional standards, is inconsistent with traditional medical malpractice doctrine. In Helling, uncontradicted testimony on both sides
established the standard practices of the ophthalmologic profession
and demonstrated that the defendants had adhered to those practices. 3 0 Testimony revealed that, as a matter of statistical probability,
26.

73 Wn. 2d 476, 438 P.2d 829 (1968). Douglas involved a plaintiff who un-

derwent surgery for a gastric ulcer and suffered paralysis afterwards, allegedly from
the injection of a spinal anesthetic. The question of causation was to be submitted to
the jury upon remand.
27. A general liberalization of the expert testimony requirement has occurred by:

(a) the expansion of the pool of experts in some states (through the abolition of
the locality rule which restricted the use of medical experts to the same or similar

communities as the one in which the defendant practiced); and (b) the use of medical books and treatises in some jurisdictions instead of expert testimony. See Comment, Malprdctice and Medical Testimony, and Note, Medical Malpractice-Expert
Testimony, supra note 24.
28. The Douglas court mistakenly referred to the standard of the medical profession as the standard of care. 73 Wn. 2d 476, 478, 438 P.2d 829, 831 (1968). By

referring to the standard of the profession as the standard of care, the court gave
further weight to the conclusion that a presumption of due care exists in this regard.

29.

The lay evidence which was excluded from consideration by the jury in

Douglas consisted, inter alia, of various records showing the diagnosis of the pa-

tient's injuries to be spinal cord damage, a possible indication that she had been given
an excessive amount of spinal anesthetic. The court held that such evidence was
admissible to establish whether a departure from the professional standard had occurred. 73 Wn. 2d at 481, 438 P.2d at 833.
30. 83 Wn. 2d at 517, 519 P.2d at 982.
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only one out of 25,000 persons under the age of 40 is expected to
contract open-angle glaucoma. 3 1 Since the incidence of glaucoma is so
minimal, the universal standard of the profession has been to refrain
from administering a routine pressure test for detection of the disease
to anyone under 40.32
The Helling court concluded that, on the facts of the case, the defendant physicians' failure to administer the pressure test at an earlier
time constituted negligence as a matter of law. Determining that the
test is simple to administer, relatively inexpensive, extremely reliable,
and involves no judgment factor, 33 the court held that reasonable
prudence necessitated the timely giving of the pressure test to the
plaintiff. 34 The court concluded that it is the "duty of the courts to say
what is required to protect patients under 40 from the damaging re35
sults of glaucoma."
The normal presumption that professional custom is equivalent to
the legally required standard of care was not recognized by the court.
Unless Helling can be placed within one of the established exceptions
to the general presumption, 36 the conclusion is virtually inescapable
that the court abolished the presumption in Helling and made a
drastic change in medical malpractice law. On the surface, Helling
does not appear to fit within either of the exceptions-there was no
medical criticism of the professional standard, and the necessity for a
timely administration of the test does not appear to be a matter of lay
competence. 37 Consequently, Helling represents a possible break from
past medical malpractice law. The enactment of R.C.W. § 4.24.290
38
represents the legislature's attempt to rectify that break.

31. Id. at 518, 519 P.2d at 983.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 519, 519 P.2d at 983.
35. Id.
36. See text accompanying notes 10-23 supra.
37. Previous courts considering the alleged negligence in diagnosis or treatment
of glaucoma have concluded that the issue is beyond the common understanding of
a layman. See, e.g., Ewing v. Goode, 78 F. 442 (S.D. Ohio 1897); Evans v. Sarrail, 208 Cal. App. 2d 478, 25 Cal. Rptr. 424 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Hurspool v.
Ralston, 48 Wn. 2d 6, 290 P.2d 981 (1955).
38. See note 6 supra.
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III.

THE INTERPRETATIONS OF HELLING AND THEIR
CONSEQUENCES-LEGISLATIVE PRE-EMPTION OR
CONTINUING VALIDITY?

A major difficulty with the decision in Helling is the uncertainty of
its rationale. In stating that reasonable prudence required the timely
giving of the pressure test to the plaintiff regardless of the standard of
the profession, 39 the Helling court may have developed a new standard of care for the medical profession; yet it failed to clarify the new
legal requirement. This failure encourages an examination of four
legal rationales40 concerning the standard of care and the expert testimony requirement, any one of which would account for the result
reached by the court in Helling.
A.

An Abolition of the Presumption that the Standard of CareIs
Equivalent to the Standard of the Profession?

The first interpretation is that the court no longer recognizes the
presumption that the standard of care in medical malpractice actions
39. 83 Wn. 2d at 519, 519 P.2d at 983.
40. Associate Justice Utter's concurring opinion in Helling, 83 Wn. 2d at 520,
519 P.2d at 984 (1974), affords another possible explanation of the decision. The
concurring opinion stated that the imposition of liability on defendants who had
acted reasonably according to the standards of the ophthalmology specialty and the
facts of the case, apparently foreclosed under normal negligence principles, approached
application of strict liability doctrine. Justice Utter advocated the imposition of liability without fault in this instance because the activity was defined with sufficient
precision to avoid a miscarriage of justice in most cases. Id. at 521, 519 P.2d at
984-85. He stated:
Lacking . . . training in this highly sophisticated profession, it seems illogical
for this court to say they failed to exercise a reasonable standard of care. It
seems to me we are, in reality, imposing liability, because, in choosing between
an innocent plaintiff and a doctor, who acted reasonably according to his specialty but who could have prevented the full effects of this disease by administering a simple, harmless test and treatment, the plaintiff should not have to
bear the risk of loss. As such, imposition of liability approaches that of strict
liability.
Id. See generally Peck, Negligence and Liability Without Fault in Tort Law, 46
WASH. L. REV. 225, 239-43 (1971).

The concurring opinion can be commended for recognizing that the majority
chose between an innocent plaintiff and a defendant whose conduct in the situation
was representative of that of members of a highly skilled and respected profession.
However, it fails to note that strict liability, as applied to the medical profession,
would create difficulties in determining whether every injury or unfortunate result
should be compensated (for example, when a calculated risk was taken in the
patient's treatment in order to prevent more severe injuries). See A. Lanzone, NoFault Medical Malpractice: Is This Really the Solution?, 11 TRIAL, May/June 1975,
at 46.
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is equivalent to the standard of the profession. Under this interpretation the special treatment accorded medical practitioners would be
eliminated, placing the medical profession squarely within the ordinary tort rules of reasonable prudence. This interpretation, probably
the most widely held, was the instigating force behind the Washington
41
legislature's subsequent enactment of R.C.W. § 4.24.290.
If Helling is interpreted in this fashion, the court discarded the customary practice test for use in determining the reasonable care standard within the medical profession. The court's reliance on two wellknown cases concerning customary practice, Texas & Pac. Ry. v.
Behymer42 and The T. J. Hooper,43 lends credence to this notion.
Both cases stand for the general tort rule that custom is only a factor,
and not necessarily a determinative one, to be considered when
judging the reasonableness of a defendant's actions. Yet Behymer and
44
Hooper differ from Helling in that they involved business customs,
which are often determined exclusively by profit motives. In contrast,
courts before Helling seemed to assume that medical customs are
more often determined by ethical concern for the patient's welfare, so
that medical practitioners act reasonably when they follow medical
custom. 45 If physicians are precluded from relying on the guideline of
custom, the uncertainty involved in losing that guideline creates serious and unjust difficulties for both the medical profession and the
trier of fact. Physicians will not know whether their commonly used
procedures are reasonable or not, and the trier of fact will be unable
to render an intelligent decision if unable to rely on testimony concerning customary methods.
Moreover, this alternative leaves uncertain the future of heretofore
standard malpractice evidentiary requirements. If the customary practice test is eliminated in determining the standard of care, the impact
of expert medical testimony is greatly lessened. The expert testimony
requirement is inextricably bound to the process of establishing the
41. See notes 5 & 6supra.
42. 189 U.S. 468 (1903).
43. 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
44. Behymer concerned a customary procedure in the railroad industry-picking
up extra freight cars with brakemen standing on top of them--while Hooper involved
the failure of tugboat owners to equip tugs with radio receiving sets.
45. Morris, supra note 15, at 1164, implies that this could be one reason the
medical profession has been immune from the general tort rule of Hooper in the
past, although he asserts that the workability of equating the standard of care with
the standard of the profession is probably the controlling factor.
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standard of care in medical malpractice law, 46 so that change in one
area causes a corresponding change in the other. Therefore, while
Helling's creation of a standard of care contrary to the recognized
practices of physicians would deflate the requirement for medical testimony, the need for such expertise nevertheless remains. As evidenced
by the court's statements concerning the tonometer test, 47 laymen still
need medical testimony in order to make reasoned decisions.
If courts are to give less weight to the normal practices of the medical profession, judicial conclusions concerning matters of medical
expertise may express erroneous views of such matters. Since a judicial decision is based on testimony admitted into evidence, the result is
more likely to hinge on incomplete or oversimplified information
under ordinary tort standards as compared to the collective medical
judgment expressed through the customary practice test. Some aspects
of the Helling opinion support this conclusion. The court stated that
the tonometer test involved no judgment factor and that its reliability
was such that if glaucoma were present, the test's results would detect
the disease immediately. 48 Medical experts in the field, however, are
not as certain of the test's capabilities. 4 9 The test, though usually
harmless, has been known to injure the cornea. 50 Also, its results are
not as definitive as the court asserted in that the test measures the
ocular hypertension within the eye, which is not always diagnostic of
51
glaucoma.
46.
47.

See text accompanying notes 24-29 supra.
The Helling court viewed the Schiotz tonometer test as simple, harmless,

inexpensive and capable of providing accurate results which do not require medical
judgment for interpretation. The tonometer measures the indentation pressure of the
globe, indicating the intraocular pressure by means of a plunger, which rests against

the cornea. Movement of the plunger is transmitted to a measured scale. See, e.g.,
Calkins, The Eyes in M. DELP & R. MANNING, MAJOR'S PHYSICAL DIAGNOSIS 62, 81-82
(7th ed. 1968); Henderson, Eye in R. JUDGE & G. ZUIDEMA, PHYSICAL DIAGNOSIS:
A PHYSIOLOGIC APPROACH TO THE CLINICAL EXAMINATION 75, 98 (2d ed. 1968).

48.
49.

83 Wn. 2d at 518, 519 P.2d at 983.
A medical response to Helling is found in Bradford, A Unique Decision, 2
J. LEGAL MED., September/October 1974, at 52 [hereinafter cited as Bradford]. Dr.
Bradford maintains that experts in the field of ophthalmology would disagree with the
court's pronouncements on the pressure test.
50. Id. at 53. The Schiotz tonometer test may scratch the cornea. Interview with
William Mulligan, M.D., a specialist in ophthalmology, in Seattle, May 12, 1975
[hereinafter cited as Mulligan Interview].
51. Bradford, supra note 49, at 54. A person may have elevated pressure and
yet not have glaucoma, according to Dr. Mulligan. Mulligan Interview, supra note 50.
He stated that there are three symptoms indicative of glaucoma: (1) elevated eye
pressure; (2) cupping of the optic disc; and (3) visual field loss. A high pressure
indicates to a physician that he should conduct more tests, but a low pressure does
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The customary practice test reduces this chance of error by presenting a collective medical opinion based upon expertise and experience over the years. Compliance with customary medical procedures
should be recognized as the only realistic test for medical malpractice
actions, for unless the matter is within the common knowledge or ex-

perience of a layman, the judge and jury are incapable of competently
evaluating whether the physician made a medically correct judgment
52
under the circumstances.

In the past, courts have recognized the incompetence of laymen to
decide these questions. As the Washington court stated in Fritz v.
53
Horsfall:
Jurors and courts are not in any way conversant with what is entirely
peculiar to the practice of medicine and surgery. They may not arbitrarily determine the proper methods of treating an ailment-that is a
medical question.
A decision with little basis in medical testimony will therefore be re54
garded as suspect by the medical profession.
Moreover, since the Helling court disregarded the undisputed testimony concerning the standard of the profession, 5 5 its opinion might
have produced an onslaught of unworthy claims which otherwise
would not have been pressed, increasing the burdens on the judicial
system and the medical profession. The Washington Legislature, by
enacting R.C.W. § 4.24.290, prevented the potentially dire conse-

quences of the first interpretation.
not preclude the possibility that a patient has glaucoma. Id. For an excellent discussion of all aspects of the disease, see generally B. BECKER AND R. SHAFFER, DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY OF THE GLAUCOMAS (1961). The authors specifically state that
an optic nerve may atrophy at normal intraocular pressure. Id. at 170-71.

52. Both McCoid, supra note 13, at 607-08, and Morris, supra note 15, at 1164,
subscribe to this belief. In defense of the customary practice test, both authors state
that since medical knowledge is very technical, the customary practice test provides
the only feasible method of evaluating a physician's diagnosis and treatment.
53. 24 Wn. 2d 14, 18, 163 P.2d 148, 150-51 (1945). See note 10 supra.
54. Dr. Bradford notes that in the wake of Helling a patient may be misled into
believing that he knows what is necessary to diagnose glaucoma. He further states:
The measurement of intraocular tension remains a very important test and . . .
should not be assigned an oversimplified value. Such matters must not be determined by common consumerist opinion, the press, presently popular medical copy,
or even by the court. . . . The acceptable standard of care should be the best
[professional] standard of the day, and it will only be determined by research
and findings of the most knowledgeable in the field.
Bradford, supra note 49, at 55.
55. See note 30 and accompanying text supra.

Medical Malpractice
B.

A Specific Standard of Conduct as a Rule of Law?

A second alternative reading of Helling is that the court announced
a standard of conduct that amounts to a rule of law. If the court regarded its decision as unique, as it did the facts of the case, 56 then it
designed a rule of law for finding negligence in a very specific situation and left intact the general presumption regarding the standard of
care in medical malpractice law.
If the decision imposed a court-made medical standard, the Helling
court was remiss in failing to recognize that such attempts have not
succeeded in the past, even in situations less demanding of expert
evaluation. The history of Justice Holmes' "stop, look, and listen" rule
of Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Goodman57 provides a good example. In
Goodman, Holmes stated that before crossing a railroad track, one
must stop, look, and listen for oncoming trains, and possibly even get
out of his vehicle if his view is obstructed. Failure to do so would constitute negligence. Justice Holmes concluded that "when the standard
'58
is clear, it should be laid down once and for all by the courts.
Goodman failed to produce the desired result, however, because
there were variables which often caused a finding of negligence to be
unjustified. Justice Cardozo expressed dissatisfaction with the
Goodman rule in Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 59 in which he stated that to
stop, get out of one's car, look, and listen would in some cases be "uncommon . . . futile, and . . . dangerous. ' 60 Justice Cardozo con61
cluded:
[There is a] need for caution in framing standards of behavior that
amount to rules of law. The need is the more urgent when there is no
background of experience out of which the standards have emerged.
They are then, not the natural flowerings of behavior . . . but rules
artificially developed, and imposed from without. . . . [Goodman]
* . * has been a source of confusion. . . to the extent that it imposes
a standard for application by the judge.
If the Helling court was attempting an experiment similar to Goodman, it failed to clarify what specific conduct is required of physi56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.,

83 Wn. 2d at 517, 519 P.2d at 982.
275 U.S. 66(1927).
Id. at 70.
292 U.S. 98 (1934).
Id. at 104.
Id. at 105-06.
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cians. The new standard of conduct can be interpreted in at least two
ways. Narrowly viewed, the holding requires Washington ophthalmologists to test for glaucoma as a routine part of every eye examination,
regardless of the patient's age and corresponding probability of contracting the disease. Whenever glaucoma develops, proof of the
ophthalmologist's failure to comply with the requirement will result in
a peremptory finding of negligence. A more expansive view is that
physicians or surgeons are required to administer routinely all tests for
the detection of a serious disease which are simple, harmless, relatively inexpensive, and whose results are definitive. The two constructions of this possible standard of conduct reveal that without a description of the exact conduct required of medical practitioners, the
standard of conduct is likely to be interpreted inconsistently and
hence defeat the reasons for establishing a rule of law in the first instance.
C.

An Additional Means of Overcoming the Presumption?

Another explanation of Helling is possible. Although the court did
not do so explicitly, it may have created a third means of overcoming
the traditional presumption that the standard of the profession is the
applicable standard of care. 62 Perhaps the court meant that the presumption is rebutted whenever a physician fails to administer any test
which can detect a disease capable of causing irreparable damage and
yet is simple to give, relatively inexpensive, and reliable.
The practical ramifications of such a broad exception to the traditional rules of medical malpractice are great. The members of the
medical profession would be placed in a difficult position, unable to
rely on one of their major considerations-the statistical probability
of harm-in determining the proper procedures for diagnosis and
treatment. Since the court held the defendants liable for their failure
to check for a disease of which there was only a one-in-25,000
chance, the difficulties which would face physicians in examining patients are apparent.
Heretofore, much greater risks have been held not to give rise to
new duties on the part of physicians. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
62. The two recognized methods of overcoming the presumption are discussed
in the text accompanying notes 19-22 supra.
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recently held in Trogun v. FruchtmanO that a one percent (0.01)
chance of an adverse reaction to a drug was too remote to warrant
holding a physician liable for malpractice. Similarly, the Washington
Court of Appeals accepted without question an established surgical
procedure for performing an esophagoscopy in which there is a threefourths of one percent (0.0075) chance of perforating the esophagus. 64 The Helling court, however, in dealing with a probability of four
one-thousandths of one percent (0.00004), found liability. A physician
who knows or reasonably should know that there is at least a one-in25,000 chance that the patient is suffering from a serious and incapacitating disease which can be arrested by early detection, according to
this third alternative, must take certain measures to check the possi-

bility. Failure to do so may result in liability for malpractice if, in
fact, the condition exists. The difficulties with such a rule are clear.
There are a considerable number of diagnostic tests which satisfy the
simplicity, economy, and safety standards of the court. 65 Helling may
63. 58 Wis. 2d 596, 207 N.W.2d 297 (1973) (alternative holding). In Trogun
a patient sued an internist to recover damages resulting from jaundice and hepatitis contracted after the defendant had prescribed isoniazid hydrazate (INH) to cure
the plaintiff's primary inactive tuberculosis. The court declared, inter alia, that an
adverse reaction to INH was rare. The plaintiffs own expert witness testified that in
his extensive experience with the drug the probability of contracting drug hepatitis
was less than one percent. Accordingly, the court held that there had been no departure from the customary practice of physicians to prescribe INH for tuberculosis
and that the physician was not negligent in his treatment of the plaintiff.
64. Mason v. Ellsworth, 3 Wn. App. 298, 474 P.2d 909 (1970). The Mason
court reversed and remanded for a new trial on the question of the propriety of the
defendant physician's apparent deviation from that established procedure. In addition,
the court held that both the doctrines of res ipsa loquitur and informed consent were
inapplicable on the facts of the case. Specifically, the court found, as a matter of law,
that the risk of perforation was so small that the resulting perforation was not reasonably foreseeable; therefore the defendant's failure to inform the plaintiff of that risk
did not breach his duty to disclose. Id. at 314, 474 P.2d at 920. The opinion recognized that there is a distinction between the applicable standards of care where, for
example, an injury results from surgery and the surgeon's techniques are challenged
and where the question is one of what constitutes a reasonably foreseeable risk for
the purposes of disclosure to obtain informed consent. Id. at 311, 474 P.2d at 918.
65. Many such tests are included within the following procedures: hemoglobin
analysis; complete blood count; urinalysis; biopsies; a general neurological examination to test reflexes; sensation tremors; gait and memory; a cranial nerve examination to diagnose muscular dystrophy and tumors; a back examination to test for
mobility; various heart, lung, throat, ear, and abdominal tests involving auscultation, percussion, and palpation; rectal and vaginal examinations; electrocardiograms;
cultures of the urine, sputum, blood, feces, and throat. For eyesight alone there are
many tests. See generally J. A. PRIOR & J. SILBERSTEIN, PHYSICAL DIAGNOSIS (4th ed.
1973). The eye examinations are discussed in Havener, Eyes, id. at 78-127.
These tests are all routine at one time or another in order to diagnose a symptom,
but they are not administered to every patient who may complain of a symptom or
problem totally unrelated to a particular test. Mulligan Interview, supranote 50.
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require that all such tests be given if the physician is to avoid liability
for malpractice.
If Helling were given the above broad reading, the undesirable
practice of "defensive medicine" 66 would become even more widespread than it is today. Reports by the medical and legal professions
alike reveal that increased malpractice litigation has been responsible
for the increased practice of defensive medicine. 67 Use of increased
precautionary measures, required for physician protection under this
rule and yet unwarranted in light of the infrequency of particular diseases, would raise the costs of treatment.6 8 The amount of time a physician must spend with a patient would increase and the number of
patients examined would decrease.6 9 Under this interpretation, the criteria emphasized by the court for identifying necessary diagnostic
tests 70 would not alleviate the apprehension of physicians confronted
71
with the uncertain dimensions of the legal rule.
66. The practice of defensive medicine involves the physician's (a) assumption
of extra precautions, and (b) refusal to assume high risks in both the diagnosis and
treatment of the patient, with a constant eye toward the possibility of a malpractice suit. See Comment, The Medical Malpractice Threat: A Study of Defensive
Medicine, 1971 DUKE L.J. 939 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Malpractice Threat].
67. A recent study revealed that, of the 35 percent of a random national sample
of 4,020 practicing physicians who responded to a detailed questionnaire, 80 percent
have taken defensive measures in their practice of medicine as a result of concern
over legal liability. Seventy percent of those responding had not even been threatened
with a malpractice suit, while only 10 percent had experienced malpractice litigation.
Paxton, Making Your Practice More Malpractice Proof, MED. EcON., September 30,
1974, at 69. See also Malpractice Threat, supra note 66.
68. A Schiotz tonometer costs from $50 to $150, but its tendency to scratch the
cornea, its relative inaccuracy, and the necessity for anesthetic drops have caused
ophthalmologists and optometrists to purchase tonometer machines, which cost
more than $2,000. The cost of these machines is most assuredly passed on to patients. Mulligan Interview, supra note 50. A random sampling of Seattle area optometrists indicates that a glaucoma test costs from $5 to $10. A similar survey among
general practitioners reveals that the combined cost of the procedures listed in note
65 supra is from $150 to $300 (a conservative estimate). Except for electrocardiograms and cultures, which take 30 to 45 minutes to administer, all of these procedures can be administered in a matter of minutes.
69. The survey discussed in note 67 supra reveals that 48 percent of the physicians responding are ordering more diagnostic tests. Among their comments: a general practitioner performs "ECG's [electrocardiograms] for any pain from neck to
navel," a dermatologist biopsies "every wart," an orthopedist "x-rays each bruise and
backache." Making Your Practice More Malpractice Proof, supra note 67, at 75. It
should be noted that unnecessary taking of individually harmless X rays may expose
the patient to an unhealthy cumulative amount of radiation. Thus, ironically, physicians could become susceptible to malpractice actions for performing tests to protect
themselves from malpractice suits.
70. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
71. The anxieties of medical practitioners stemming from Helling are reflected
in the many articles concerning the decision in medical magazines and newsletters.
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D.

A Recognition of a BroaderScope for the Exercise of Lay
Judgment?

Helling may be interpreted in a fourth way which changes the medical malpractice rules only slightly, reduces the uncertainties accompanying the decision, and remains valid despite the subsequent enactment of R.C.W. § 4.24.290. This interpretation retains the traditional
presumption that the standard of the profession is the standard of care
with its two exceptions or means for its rebuttal: introducing expert
testimony critical of the professional standard and establishing that
the matters in question are within the competence of a layman. However, it broadens the scope of the matters within the common knowledge of laymen. Since the court in Helling relied on no expert criticism of the standard of the profession, it may have concluded that its
decision required no expert testimony. Thus, the court may have decided simply that the matter was one of lay competence. If so, it was
operating within the well-recognized common knowledge exception.
This interpretation allows Helling to retain a modicum of significance
despite the passage of the new legislation.
Medical testimony at the trial revealed that the professional custom
of refraining from routine pressure testing of persons under 40 is based
primarily on one factor-the low statistical probability that those persons will contract glaucoma. The court may well have considered itself as competent as a medical expert to conclude that despite such a
low probability, reasonable prudence required the early administration
of the test, especially when the seriousness of the harm resulting from
the delay was viewed in light of the simplicity of the test. The Court of
Appeals, in Mason v. Ellsworth,7 2 found as a matter of law that the
probability of perforation during an esophagoscopy is so low that an
actual perforation is not reasonably foreseeable.73 Hence it appears
that once the trier of fact is told that the decision to administer a particular medical procedure is based primarily on the statistical probability of harm and is also informed of what that probability is, the
See, e.g., O'Hern,

Leading Cases-Unrecognized Standard of Care Imposed by

Court, 230 J.A.M.A. 1577 (1974); Bradford, supra note 49; An 'Eye' to the Future? MALPRACTICE DIGEST, May/June 1974, at 4. According to Professor [of Law]
William Curran, Helling and. other recent cases tend to make the'physician the guarantor'of the health of his patient. THE PHYSICIAN'S LEGAL BlUEF, January 1975, at 1.
72. 3 Wn. App. 298,474 P.2d 909 (1970).
73. See note 64 and accompanying text supra.
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determination of the applicable standard of care becomes a matter of lay
competence. Prior to Helling, this exception, though often based on
the particular facts of each case, had been primarily limited to
"sponge cases," 74 cases in which a physician failed to take an X ray,75
and cases of gross medical misconduct.76 By recognizing the capacity
of laymen to evaluate the conduct of medical practitioners under such
circumstances, this interpretation of Helling increases the degree of
judicial respect for lay opinion and enables the case to survive the recent legislative action. Thus, under this fourth alternative, the scope
of the common knowledge exception is broader than before, but the
traditional presumption remains intact.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Traditionally, medical practitioners have been treated with deference by courts in medical malpractice actions. The requirement of
expert testimony permits physicians, by and large, to establish their
own standard of care, which generally is presumed to be reasonable.
The Helling decision raised the possibility of a drastic change from
that unspoken presumption.
The failure of the Helling court to clarify the reasoning behind its
decision allowed the postulation of several legal rationales. Of the
four possible explanations, the fourth would have been clearly preferable had R.C.W. § 4.24.290 not been enacted, for it would have
avoided the adverse consequences inherent in the other three. A standard of care which does not recognize the standard of the profession
as presumptively reasonable would result in a greater chance of judicial error, causing serious difficulties both for the medical profession

74. See, e.g., McCormick v. Jones, 152 Wash. 508, 278 P. 181 (1929) (sponge
left in wound); Williams v. Wurdemann, 71 Wash. 390, 128 P. 639 (1912) (cotton
packing left in nose); Wharton v. Warner, 75 Wash. 470, 135 P. 235 (1913) (metallic spring left in uterus). See also McCoid, supra note 13, at 610.
75. The exception with regard to X-ray cases was well stated in Agnew v. City
of Los Angeles, 82 Cal. App. 2d 616, 186 P.2d 450 (Dist. Ct. App. 1947), in which
a court held that the use of an X ray to diagnose a fracture was within the common
understanding of a layman and that a failure to take an X ray of the patient's hip
constituted negligence. See also McCoid, supra note 13, at 575.
76. See, e.g., Helland v. Bridenstine, 55 Wash. 470, 104 P. 626 (1909) (physician's use of an infected instrument in performing a vaginal inspection); Swanson v.
Hood, 99 Wash. 506, 170 P. 135 (1918) (physician's removal of a wire from a bone
with such great force that splinters of the bone were pulled away).
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and for patients. Thus, by maintaining the presumption and its historical exceptions, and by merely broadening the scope of a layman's
common knowledge to include, when applicable, the determination of
the standard of medical care on the basis of the statistical probability
of harm, a major change in the law of medical malpractice can be
averted in jurisdictions still open to a Helling-type holding.
Furthermore, while the first three interpretations have been effectively foreclosed by the enactment of R.C.W. § 4.24.290, the fourth
statement of the Helling holding has significance even after the statute's enactment. Although the new statute has successfully removed
the most serious ramifications of Helling, if the fourth interpretation is
adopted, the case nevertheless expands the layman's role in deciding
the outcome of future medical malpractice suits. The direct legislative
response to Helling has allayed the fears of those who believe that a
new standard of care had been created. However, such legislation is at
best a stopgap measure in the present medical malpractice crisis and
should not preclude greater lay participation in determining the applicable standards of care where accurate statistical assessments of risk
are available.
Alan J. Peizer
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